Bhopal: The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later
- Alan Taylor
- Dec 2, 2014
- 28 Photos
- In Focus
Thirty years ago, on the night of December 2, 1984, an accident at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, released at least 30 tons of a highly toxic gas called methyl isocyanate, as well as a number of other poisonous gases. The pesticide plant was surrounded by shanty towns, leading to more than 600,000 people being exposed to the deadly gas cloud that night. The gases stayed low to the ground, causing victims throats and eyes to burn, inducing nausea, and many deaths. Estimates of the death toll vary from as few as 3,800 to as many as 16,000, but government figures now refer to an estimate of 15,000 killed over the years. Toxic material remains, and 30 years later, many of those who were exposed to the gas have given birth to physically and mentally disabled children. For decades, survivors have been fighting to have the site cleaned up, but they say the efforts were slowed when Michigan-based Dow Chemical took over Union Carbide in 2001. Human rights groups say that thousands of tons of hazardous waste remain buried underground, and the government has conceded the area is contaminated. There has, however, been no long-term epidemiological research which conclusively proves that birth defects are directly related to the drinking of the contaminated water.
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Trees frame a rusting building at the abandoned former Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, on November 11, 2014. On the night of December 2, 1984, the factory owned by the U.S. multinational Union Carbide Corporation accidentally leaked methyl isocyanate and other highly toxic gases into the air, killing thousands of largely poor Indians in the neighborhoods nearby.
In December 1984, the entrance to the U.S.-owned Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, shortly after the release of poisonous gas.
AP Photo/Peter Kemp
Two men carry children blinded by the Union Carbide chemical gas leak to a hospital in Bhopal on December 5, 1984.
AP Photo/Sondeep Shankar
Thousands of animals perished in the disaster as well, poisoned by the huge gas leak. Photo taken on December 4, 1984.
A photo from December 4, 1984, shows relatives surrounding victims of the Bhopal tragedy.
A victim of the Bhopal tragedy walks in the streets on December 4, 1984. In the background is the site of the factory.
This photograph taken on December 17, 1984, shows bodies of victims lined up following a poison gas leak which killed thousands from the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal.
Water is hosed onto canvas screens set up around the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal on December 18, 1984, as part of measures taken to avoid further leakage of fumes that had earlier taken a huge toll of deaths and injuries.
AP Photo/Peter Kemp
A December 1984 photo shows victims who lost sight after a poison gas leak from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, in front of the US Union Carbide factory (shown in background).
A worker cleans dust as he displays a panel of photographs of some of the thousands of people who died in the 1984 Bhopal gas disaster at the forensic department of Gandhi Medical college in Bhopal on June 8, 2010.
AP Photo/Prakash Hatvalne
(1 of 2) A “before” photograph, showing Ram Chandra (left) with his wife Prema in an undated family photograph in Bhopal before the 1984 disaster.
(2 of 2) Ram Chandra sits alone in Bhopal on November 15, 2014. Chandra said that his wife Prema died as a result of gas poisoning after the 1984 Bhopal disaster.
(1 of 2) A “before” photograph, showing Zubeida (right) with her husband Salim Rehman in an undated family photograph taken before the 1984 disaster.
(2 of 2) Zubeida Bi sits alone in Bhopal on November 11, 2014. Bi said that her husband Rehman died as a result of gas poisoning after the 1984 Bhopal disaster.
Children play in front of their homes near the Union Carbide factory on November 27, 2009 in Bhopal, India.
Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images
The flare tower, where highly toxic methyl isocyanate gas was released into the air in the 1984 disaster, at the abandoned Union Carbide pesticide factory in Bhopal on November 28, 2014.
Indranil Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images
Plants grow over a staircase at the abandoned former Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal November 14, 2014.
A network of pipes rust at the abandoned Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal on November 14, 2014.
Former maintenance worker, Mohammed Yaqub, poses in his house with his old identity card from the defunct Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal where he once worked, on November 13, 2014.
Children are reflected in groundwater, believed to be contaminated, near the site of the deserted Union Carbide factory on November 28, 2009 in Bhopal, India.
Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images
A girl who suffers from hearing and speech disorders reacts to the camera at a rehabilitation center supported by Bhopal Medical Appeal, for children who were born with mental and physical disabilities, in Bhopal, on November 11, 2014. The rehabilitation center only treats families they believe have been affected by the Union Carbide gas leak 30 years ago.
Sixty-four-year-old Zafar Ahmed, receives treatment at a clinic supported by Bhopal Medical Appeal in Bhopal on November 14, 2014.
1984 Bhopal gas disaster survivor Akbar Khan, 70, sits inside a steam box as part of a rehabilitation using traditional Ayurvedic treatment at the Sambhavna Trust Clinic in Bhopal on December 1, 2014.
Indranil Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images
Partially blind gas victim waits for a verdict with other victims in the premises of Bhopal court in Bhopal, India, on June 7, 2010. An Indian court convicted seven former senior employees of Union Carbide’s Indian subsidiary of “death by negligence” for their roles in the Bhopal gas tragedy that left thousands of people dead more than a quarter century previously in the world’s worst industrial disaster.
AP Photo/Prakash Hatvalne
A boy who was born with a mental disability looks out of a window at a rehabilitation center supported by Bhopal Medical Appeal for children who were born with mental and physical disabilities in Bhopal on November 11, 2014.
Fifteen year old Sachin Kumar crawls on his hands and knees through his home in a slum near the site of the deserted Union Carbide factory on November 30, 2009 in Bhopal, India. Sachin lives with his parents Suresh and Sangita, his 3 sisters, Jyoti, Arti and Punam and his brother Ravi, in a slum where a number of people affected by either water contamination or poison contamination have been relocated. Sachin was born with a birth defect rendering his legs practically useless. He had been receiving physical therapy treatment and education from the Chingari Trust rehabilitation Center for victims of the 1984 gas tragedy, however his health has taken a turn for the worse and his legs, now covered with open sores, restrict him from traveling to the major road where the Chingari Trust bus can pick him up for daily treatment. The oldest of four, Sachin spends his days playing board games with his friends and a rare game of cricket, which he sees as the fulfillment of his dreams of becoming a professional cricket player.
Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images
Bhopal Gas disaster survivors shout slogans as they burn an effigy during a protest rally in Bhopal on December 2, 2014.
Indranil Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images
A security guard stands as sun rays pass through the defunct machinery at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal on December 1, 2009.
AP Photo/Altaf Qadri
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Memorial by Dutch artist Ruth Kupferschmidt for those killed and disabled by the 1984 toxic gas release
|Date||2 December 1984– 3 December 1984|
|Location||Bhopal , Madhya Pradesh , India|
|Coordinates||23°16′51″N 77°24′38″E / 23.28083°N 77.41056°E Coordinates : 23°16′51″N 77°24′38″E / 23.28083°N 77.41056°E|
|Also known as||Bhopal gas tragedy|
|Cause||Methyl Isocyanate leak from Union Carbide India Limited plant|
|Deaths||At least 3,787; over 16,000 claimed|
|Non-fatal injuries||At least 558,125|
The Bhopal disaster, also referred to as the Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak incident on the night of 2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal , Madhya Pradesh, India. It is considered to be the world’s worst industrial disaster .   Over 500,000 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas. The highly toxic substance made its way into and around the small towns located near the plant. 
Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.  A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the leak caused 558,125 injuries, including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.  Others estimate that 8,000 died within two weeks, and another 8,000 or more have since died from gas-related diseases.  The cause of the disaster remains under debate. The Indian government and local activists argue that slack management and deferred maintenance created a situation where routine pipe maintenance caused a backflow of water into a MIC tank, triggering the disaster. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) argues water entered the tank through an act of sabotage.
The owner of the factory, UCIL, was majority owned by UCC, with Indian Government-controlled banks and the Indian public holding a 49.1 percent stake. In 1989, UCC paid $470 million ($929 million in 2017 dollars) to settle litigation stemming from the disaster. In 1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL), which subsequently merged with McLeod Russel (India) Ltd . Eveready ended clean-up on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster.
Civil and criminal cases were filed in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC and Warren Anderson , UCC CEO at the time of the disaster.   In June 2010, seven former employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by Indian law . An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement was passed.  Anderson died on 29 September 2014. 
- 1 The pre-event phase
- 1.1 Earlier leaks
- 2 The leakage and its subsequent effects
- 2.1 Liquid MIC storage
- 2.2 The release
- 2.3 Acute effects
- 2.4 Gas cloud composition
- 2.4.1 Immediate aftermath
- 2.5 Subsequent legal action
- 2.6 Post-settlement activity
- 3 Long-term effects
- 3.1 Long-term health effects
- 3.2 Health care
- 3.3 Environmental rehabilitation
- 3.4 Occupational and habitation rehabilitation
- 3.5 Economic rehabilitation
- 3.6 Other impacts
- 4 Causes of the disaster: overview
- 4.1 Causes of the disaster: The “corporate negligence” argument
- 4.2 Causes of the disaster: the “disgruntled employee sabotage” case
- 4.3 The argument for sabotage
- 5 Additional Union Carbide actions
- 5.1 Charges against UCC and UCIL employees
- 6 Ongoing contamination
- 7 In popular culture
- 8 Activism
- 8.1 Local activism
- 8.2 International activism
- 8.3 Activist organisations
- 8.4 Settlement fund hoax
- 8.5 Monitoring of Bhopal activists
- 9 See also
- 10 Citations
- 11 References
- 11.1 Union Carbide Corporation
- 12 External links
The pre-event phase
The UCIL factory was built in 1969 to produce the pesticide Sevin (UCC’s brand name for carbaryl ) using methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediate.  An MIC production plant was added to the UCIL site in 1979.    The chemical process employed in the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to form MIC, which was then reacted with 1-naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. Another manufacturer, Bayer, also used this MIC-intermediate process at the chemical plant once owned by UCC at Institute, West Virginia , in the United States.  
After the Bhopal plant was built, other manufacturers (including Bayer ) produced carbaryl without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing cost . This “route” differed from the MIC-free routes used elsewhere, in which the same raw materials were combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene first reacting with naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which was then reacted with methylamine. In the early 1980s, the demand for pesticides had fallen, but production continued, leading to build-up of stores of unused MIC where that method was used.  
In 1976, two local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant.   In 1981, a worker was accidentally splashed with phosgene as he was carrying out a maintenance job of the plant’s pipes. In a panic, he removed his gas mask and inhaled a large amount of toxic phosgene gas, leading to his death just 72 hours later.   Following these events, journalist Rajkumar Keswani began investigating and published his findings in Bhopal’s local paper Rapat, in which he urged “Wake up people of Bhopal, you are on the edge of a volcano”.  
In January 1982, a phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks. One month later, in February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers. In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body. Later that same year, in October 1982, there was another MIC leak. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. During 1983 and 1984, there were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride , sometimes in combination.  
The leakage and its subsequent effects
Liquid MIC storage
The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000 liters liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619. In the months leading up to the December leak, liquid MIC production was in progress and being used to fill these tanks. UCC safety regulations specified that no one tank should be filled more than 50% (here, 30 tons) with liquid MIC. Each tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. This pressurization allowed liquid MIC to be pumped out of each tank as needed, and also kept impurities out of the tanks. 
In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the ability to effectively contain most of its nitrogen gas pressure. It meant that the liquid MIC contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure, tank E610 contained 42 tons of liquid MIC.   Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance. Maintenance included the shutdown of the plant’s flare tower so that a corroded pipe could be repaired.  With the flare tower still out of service, production of carbaryl was resumed in late November, using MIC stored in the two tanks still in service. An attempt to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, so the 42 tons of liquid MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of it. 
Tank 610 in 2010. During decontamination of the plant, tank 610 was removed from its foundation and left aside.
Methylamine (1) reacts with phosgene (2) producing methyl isocyanate (3) which reacts with 1-naphthol (4) to yield carbaryl (5)
In early December 1984, most of the plant’s MIC related safety systems were malfunctioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes.  During the late evening hours of 2 December 1984, water was believed to have entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 whilst trying to unclog it, which contained 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late October. 
The introduction of water into the tank subsequently resulted in a runaway exothermic reaction , which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and various other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.  The pressure in tank E610, although initially normal at 10:30 p.m., had increased by a factor of five to 10 psi (34.5 to 69 kPa) by 11 p.m. Two different senior refinery employees assumed the reading was instrumentation malfunction.  By 11:30 p.m., workers in the MIC area were feeling the effects of minor exposure to MIC gas, and began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m., and reported to the MIC supervisor on duty at the time. The decision was made to address the problem after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime, employees were instructed to continue looking for leaks. The incident was discussed by MIC area employees during the break. 
In the five minutes after the tea break ended at 12:40 a.m., the reaction in tank E610 reached a critical state at an alarming speed. Temperatures in the tank were off the scale, maxed out beyond 25 °C (77 °F), and the pressure in the tank was indicated at 40 psi (275.8 kPa). One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610 crack as the emergency relief valve burst open, and pressure in the tank continued to increase to 55 psi (379.2 kPa) even after atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas had begun.  Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least partially mitigated by at least three safety devices which were malfunctioning, not in use, insufficiently sized or otherwise rendered inoperable:  
- A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid MIC, shut down in January 1982, and whose freon had been removed in June 1984. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high temperature alarm, set to sound at 11 °C (52 °F) had long since been disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 15 °C (59 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F) 
- A flare tower, to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to neutralise a leak of the size produced by tank E610
- A vent gas scrubber, which had been deactivated at the time and was in ‘standby’ mode, and similarly had insufficient caustic soda and power to safely stop a leak of the magnitude produced
About 30 metric tons of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes.  This would increase to 40 metric tons within two hours time.  The gases were blown in a southeasterly direction over Bhopal.  
A UCIL employee triggered the plant’s alarm system at 12:50 a.m. as the concentration of gas in and around the plant became difficult to tolerate.   Activation of the system triggered two siren alarms: one that sounded inside the UCIL plant, and a second directed outward to the public and the city of Bhopal. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one another in 1982, so that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while turning off the public one, and this is exactly what was done: the public siren briefly sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks.    Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.
Bhopal’s superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town inspector, that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were fleeing a gas leak at approximately 1 a.m.  Calls to the UCIL plant by police between 1:25 and 2:10 a.m. gave assurances twice that “everything is OK”, and on the last attempt made, “we don’t know what has happened, sir”.  With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city’s Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia , then phosgene . Finally, they received an updated report that it was “MIC” (rather than “methyl isocyanate”), which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and received no immediate information about. 
The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 petered out at approximately 2:00 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the plant’s public siren was sounded for an extended period of time, after first having been quickly silenced an hour and a half earlier.  Some minutes after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had occurred at all), and that “the leak had been plugged.”  Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their doors to investigate commotion, rather than having been instructed to shelter in place , or to evacuate before the arrival of the gas in the first place. 
Reversible reaction of glutathione (top) with methyl isocyanate (MIC, middle) allows the MIC to be transported into the body
The initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation, burning in the respiratory tract, blepharospasm , breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations, as methyl isocyanate gas is approximately twice as dense as air and hence in an open environment has a tendency to fall toward the ground. 
Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking , reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema . Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema , tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis .  The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by around 200%. 
Gas cloud composition
Apart from MIC, based on laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud most likely also contained chloroform , dichloromethane , hydrogen chloride , methyl amine , dimethylamine , trimethylamine and carbon dioxide , that was either present in the tank or was produced in the storage tank when MIC, chloroform and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground and spread in the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities.  The chemical reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol . 
Laboratory investigations by CSIR and UCC scientists failed to demonstrate the presence of hydrogen cyanide.  
In the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian government , which subsequently failed to make data public, contributing to the confusion. The initial investigation was conducted entirely by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation . The UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson , together with a technical team, immediately traveled to India. Upon arrival Anderson was placed under house arrest and urged by the Indian government to leave the country within 24 hours. Union Carbide organized a team of international medical experts, as well as supplies and equipment, to work with the local Bhopal medical community, and the UCC technical team began assessing the cause of the gas leak.
The health care system immediately became overloaded. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70 percent were under-qualified doctors. Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and hospitals were not aware of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation.  :6
Bhopal gas disaster girl, the burial of one iconic victim of the gas leak (4 December 1984)
There were mass funerals and cremations. Photographer Pablo Bartholemew , on commission with press agency Rapho , took an iconic color photograph of a burial on 4 December, Bhopal gas disaster girl. Another photographer present, Raghu Rai , took a black and white photo. The photographers did not ask for the identity of the father or child as she was buried, and no relative has since confirmed it. As such, the identity of the girl remains unknown. Both photos became symbolic of the suffering of victims of the Bhopal disaster, and Bartholomew’s went on to win the 1984 World Press Photo of the Year. 
Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers’ safety fears. Fishing was prohibited causing further supply shortages. 
Lacking any safe alternative, on 16 December, tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC by reactivating the plant and continuing the manufacture of pesticide. Despite safety precautions such as having water carrying helicopters continually overflying the plant, this led to a second mass evacuation from Bhopal. The Government of India passed the “Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act” that gave the government rights to represent all victims, whether or not in India. Complaints of lack of information or misinformation were widespread. An Indian government spokesman said, “Carbide is more interested in getting information from us than in helping our relief work”. 
Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000.  Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims.
Subsequent legal action
Victims of Bhopal disaster march in September 2006 demanding the extradition of American Warren Anderson from the United States.
Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities, and the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster,  leading to the beginning of legal proceedings. Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States federal court system. On 17 April 1985, Federal District court judge John F. Keenan (overseeing one lawsuit) suggested that “‘fundamental human decency’ required Union Carbide to provide between $5 million and $10 million to immediately help the injured” and suggested the money could be quickly distributed through the International Red Cross.  UCC, on the notion that doing so did not constitute an admission of liability and the figure could be credited toward any future settlement or judgement, offered a $5 million relief fund two days later.  The Indian government turned down the offer. 
In March 1986 UCC proposed a settlement figure, endorsed by plaintiffs’ U.S. attorneys, of $350 million that would, according to the company, “generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between $500–600 million over 20 years”. In May, litigation was transferred from the United States to Indian courts by a U.S. District Court ruling. Following an appeal of this decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer, judging, in January 1987, that UCIL was a “separate entity, owned, managed and operated exclusively by Indian citizens in India”. 
The Government of India refused the offer from Union Carbide and claimed US$3.3 billion.  The Indian Supreme Court told both sides to come to an agreement and “start with a clean slate” in November 1988.  Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster.  The amount was immediately paid.
Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original $470 million, dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the original decision. The Court ordered the Indian government “to purchase, out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms” and cover any shortfall in the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL “voluntarily” fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to this. 
In 1991, the local Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the decision of the lower federal courts in October 1993, meaning that victims of the Bhopal disaster could not seek damages in a U.S. court. 
In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to release any remaining settlement funds to victims. And in September 2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all original compensation claims and revised petitions had been “cleared”.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City upheld the dismissal of remaining claims in the case of Bano v. Union Carbide Corporation in 2006. This move blocked plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and claims for property damages and remediation. In the view of UCC, “the ruling reaffirms UCC’s long-held positions and finally puts to rest—both procedurally and substantively—the issues raised in the class action complaint first filed against Union Carbide in 1999 by Haseena Bi and several organisations representing the residents of Bhopal”. 
In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, all Indian nationals and many in their 70s, were convicted of causing death by negligence : Keshub Mahindra, former non-executive chairman of Union Carbide India Limited; V. P. Gokhale, managing director; Kishore Kamdar, vice-president; J. Mukund, works manager; S. P. Chowdhury, production manager; K. V. Shetty, plant superintendent; and S. I. Qureshi, production assistant. They were each sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined Rs. 100,000 (US$2,124). All were released on bail shortly after the verdict.
US Federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, was filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for “crimes against humanity.”  It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and subsequent appeal denied.  Anderson died in 2014.
In 2018, The Atlantic called it the “world’s worst industrial disaster.” 
Long-term health effects
Some data about the health effects are still not available. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) was forbidden to publish health effect data until 1994. 
A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being “gas affected,” affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been officially certified. Ingrid Eckerman estimated 8,000 died within two weeks.  
The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release. 
Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries. 
A cohort of 80,021 exposed people was registered, along with a control group, a cohort of 15,931 people from areas not exposed to MIC. Nearly every year since 1986, they have answered the same questionnaire. It shows overmortality and overmorbidity in the exposed group. Bias and confounding factors cannot be excluded from the study. Because of migration and other factors, 75% of the cohort is lost, as the ones who moved out are not followed.  
A number of clinical studies are performed. The quality varies, but the different reports support each other.  Studied and reported long term health effects are:
- Eyes: Chronic conjunctivitis, scars on cornea, corneal opacities, early cataracts
- Respiratory tracts: Obstructive and/or restrictive disease, pulmonary fibrosis, aggravation of TB and chronic bronchitis
- Neurological system: Impairment of memory, finer motor skills, numbness etc.
- Psychological problems: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
- Children’s health: Peri- and neonatal death rates increased. Failure to grow, intellectual impairment, etc.
Missing or insufficient fields for research are female reproduction, chromosomal aberrations, cancer, immune deficiency, neurological sequelae, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and children born after the disaster. Late cases that might never be highlighted are respiratory insufficiency, cardiac insufficiency (cor pulmonale), cancer and tuberculosis. Bhopal now has high rates of birth defects and records a miscarriage rate 7x higher than the national average. 
A 2014 report in Mother Jones quotes a “spokesperson for the Bhopal Medical Appeal, which runs free health clinics for survivors” as saying “An estimated 120,000 to 150,000 survivors still struggle with serious medical conditions including nerve damage, growth problems, gynecological disorders, respiratory issues, birth defects, and elevated rates of cancer and tuberculosis.” 
The Government of India had focused primarily on increasing the hospital-based services for gas victims thus hospitals had been built after the disaster. When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the medical care of the survivors. Thus, Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998 and was obliged to give free care for survivors for eight years. BMHRC was a 350-bedded super speciality hospital where heart surgery and hemodialysis were done. There was a dearth of gynaecology, obstetrics and paediatrics. Eight mini-units (outreach health centres) were started and free health care for gas victims were to be offered until 2006.  The management had also faced problems with strikes, and the quality of the health care being disputed.   Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust, registered in 1995, that gives modern as well as ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of charge.  
When the factory was closed in 1986, pipes, drums and tanks were sold. The MIC and the Sevin plants are still there, as are storages of different residues. Isolation material is falling down and spreading.  The area around the plant was used as a dumping area for hazardous chemicals. In 1982 tubewells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned and tests in 1989 performed by UCC’s laboratory revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish.  Several other studies had also shown polluted soil and groundwater in the area. Reported polluting compounds include 1-naphthol , naphthalene , Sevin , tarry residue , mercury , toxic organochlorines , volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium , copper, nickel, lead, hexachloroethane , hexachlorobutadiene , and the pesticide HCH . 
In order to provide safe drinking water to the population around the UCIL factory, Government of Madhya Pradesh presented a scheme for improvement of water supply.  In December 2008, the Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the toxic waste should be incinerated at Ankleshwar in Gujarat, which was met by protests from activists all over India.  On 8 June 2012, the Centre for incineration of toxic Bhopal waste agreed to pay ₹250 million (US$3.5 million) to dispose of UCIL chemical plants waste in Germany.  On 9 August 2012, Supreme court directed the Union and Madhya Pradesh Governments to take immediate steps for disposal of toxic waste lying around and inside the factory within six months. 
A U.S. court rejected the lawsuit blaming UCC for causing soil and water pollution around the site of the plant and ruled that responsibility for remedial measures or related claims rested with the State Government and not with UCC.  In 2005, the state government invited various Indian architects to enter their “concept for development of a memorial complex for Bhopal gas tragedy victims at the site of Union Carbide”. In 2011, a conference was held on the site, with participants from European universities which was aimed for the same.  
Occupational and habitation rehabilitation
33 of the 50 planned work-sheds for gas victims started. All except one was closed down by 1992. 1986, the MP government invested in the Special Industrial Area Bhopal. 152 of the planned 200 work sheds were built and in 2000, 16 were partially functioning. It was estimated that 50,000 persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims had found regular employment under the government’s scheme. The government also planned 2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings in what is called the “widow’s colony” outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the upper floors and it was not possible to keep cattle which were their primary occupation. Infrastructure like buses, schools, etc. were missing for at least a decade. 
Immediate relieves were decided two days after the tragedy. Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period along with ration cards.  Madhya Pradesh government’s finance department allocated ₹874 million (US$12 million) for victim relief in July 1985.   Widow pension of ₹200 (US$2.80)/per month (later ₹750 (US$10)) were provided. The government also decided to pay ₹1,500 (US$21) to families with monthly income ₹500 (US$7.00) or less. As a result of the interim relief, more children were able to attend school, more money was spent on treatment and food, and housing also eventually improved. From 1990 interim relief of ₹200 (US$2.80) was paid to everyone in the family who was born before the disaster. 
The final compensation, including interim relief for personal injury was for the majority ₹25,000 (US$350). For death claim, the average sum paid out was ₹62,000 (US$860). Each claimant were to be categorised by a doctor. In court, the claimants were expected to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” that death or injury in each case was attributable to exposure. In 1992, 44 percent of the claimants still had to be medically examined. 
By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200. 
In 2007, 1,029,517 cases were registered and decided. Number of awarded cases were 574,304 and number of rejected cases 455,213. Total compensation awarded was ₹15,465 million (US$220 million).  On 24 June 2010, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved a ₹12,650 million (US$180 million) aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government. 
In 1985, Henry Waxman , a California Democrat, called for a U.S. government inquiry into the Bhopal disaster, which resulted in U.S. legislation regarding the accidental release of toxic chemicals in the United States. 
Causes of the disaster: overview
There are two main lines of argument involving the disaster.
The “Corporate Negligence” point of view argues that the disaster was caused by a potent combination of under-maintained and decaying facilities, a weak attitude towards safety, and an undertrained workforce, culminating in worker actions that inadvertently enabled water to penetrate the MIC tanks in the absence of properly working safeguards.  
The “Worker Sabotage” point of view argues that it was not physically possible for the water to enter the tank without concerted human effort, and that extensive testimony and engineering analysis leads to a conclusion that water entered the tank when a rogue individual employee hooked a water hose directly to an empty valve on the side of the tank. This point of view further argues that the Indian government took extensive actions to hide this possibility in order to attach blame to UCC. 
Theories differ as to how the water entered the tank. At the time, workers were cleaning out a clogged pipe with water about 400 feet from the tank. They claimed that they were not told to isolate the tank with a pipe slip-blind plate. The operators assumed that owing to bad maintenance and leaking valves, it was possible for the water to leak into the tank.  
This water entry route could not be reproduced despite strenuous efforts by motivated parties.  UCC claims that a “disgruntled worker” deliberately connecting a hose to a pressure gauge connection was the real cause.  
Early the next morning, a UCIL manager asked the instrument engineer to replace the gauge. UCIL’s investigation team found no evidence of the necessary connection; the investigation was totally controlled by the government, denying UCC investigators access to the tank or interviews with the operators.  
Causes of the disaster: The “corporate negligence” argument
This point of view argues that management (and to some extent, local government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous working environment to develop. Factors cited include the filling of the MIC tanks beyond recommended levels, poor maintenance after the plant ceased MIC production at the end of 1984, allowing several safety systems to be inoperable due to poor maintenance, and switching off safety systems to save money— including the MIC tank refrigeration system which could have mitigated the disaster severity, and non-existent catastrophe management plans.   Other factors identified by government inquiries included undersized safety devices and the dependence on manual operations.  Specific plant management deficiencies that were identified include the lack of skilled operators, reduction of safety management, insufficient maintenance, and inadequate emergency action plans.  
Underinvestment is cited as contributing to an environment. In attempts to reduce expenses, $1.25 million of cuts were placed upon the plant which affected the factory’s employees and their conditions.  Kurzman argues that “cuts … meant less stringent quality control and thus looser safety rules. A pipe leaked? Don’t replace it, employees said they were told … MIC workers needed more training? They could do with less. Promotions were halted, seriously affecting employee morale and driving some of the most skilled … elsewhere”.  Workers were forced to use English manuals, even though only a few had a grasp of the language.  
Subsequent research highlights a gradual deterioration of safety practices in regard to the MIC, which had become less relevant to plant operations. By 1984, only six of the original twelve operators were still working with MIC and the number of supervisory personnel had also been halved. No maintenance supervisor was placed on the night shift and instrument readings were taken every two hours, rather than the previous and required one-hour readings.   Workers made complaints about the cuts through their union but were ignored. One employee was fired after going on a 15-day hunger strike. 70% of the plant’s employees were fined before the disaster for refusing to deviate from the proper safety regulations under pressure from the management.  
In addition, some observers, such as those writing in the Trade Environmental Database (TED) Case Studies as part of the Mandala Project from American University , have pointed to “serious communication problems and management gaps between Union Carbide and its Indian operation”, characterised by “the parent companies [ sic ] hands-off approach to its overseas operation” and “cross-cultural barriers”. 
Adequacy of equipment and safety regulations
The factory was not well equipped to handle the gas created by the sudden addition of water to the MIC tank. The MIC tank alarms had not been working for four years and there was only one manual back-up system, compared to a four-stage system used in the United States.     The flare tower and several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service for five months before the disaster. Only one gas scrubber was operating: it could not treat such a large amount of MIC with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which would have brought the concentration down to a safe level.  The flare tower could only handle a quarter of the gas that leaked in 1984, and moreover it was out of order at the time of the incident.     To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system was idle. The MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius, not the 4.5 degrees advised by the manual.     Even the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was non-operational for unknown reasons.     Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks, had the valves been faulty, were not installed and their installation had been omitted from the cleaning checklist.    As MIC is water-soluble, deluge guns were in place to contain escaping gases from the stack. The water pressure was too weak for the guns to spray high enough to reach the gas which would have reduced the concentration of escaping gas significantly.     In addition to it, carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they were known to corrode when exposed to acid. 
According to the operators, the MIC tank pressure gauge had been malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other tanks were used, rather than repairing the gauge. The build-up in temperature and pressure is believed to have affected the magnitude of the gas release.     UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of 3 December 1984.  The design of the MIC plant, following government guidelines, was “Indianized” by UCIL engineers to maximise the use of indigenous materials and products. Mumbai-based Humphreys and Glasgow Consultants Pvt. Ltd., were the main consultants, Larsen & Toubro fabricated the MIC storage tanks, and Taylor of India Ltd. provided the instrumentation.  In 1998, during civil action suits in India, it emerged that the plant was not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to cope with incidents of this magnitude. This included not informing local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and manufactured at Bhopal.    
Safety audits were done every year in the US and European UCC plants, but only every two years in other parts of the world.   Before a “Business Confidential” safety audit by UCC in May 1982, the senior officials of the corporation were well aware of “a total of 61 hazards, 30 of them major and 11 minor in the dangerous phosgene/methyl isocyanate units” in Bhopal.   In the audit 1982, it was indicated that worker performance was below standards.   Ten major concerns were listed.  UCIL prepared an action plan, but UCC never sent a follow-up team to Bhopal. Many of the items in the 1982 report were temporarily fixed, but by 1984, conditions had again deteriorated.  In September 1984, an internal UCC report on the West Virginia plant in the USA revealed a number of defects and malfunctions. It warned that “a runaway reaction could occur in the MIC unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks”. This report was never forwarded to the Bhopal plant, although the main design was the same. 
Causes of the disaster: the “disgruntled employee sabotage” case
Now owned by Dow Chemical Company , Union Carbide maintains a website dedicated to the tragedy and claims that the incident was the result of sabotage, stating that sufficient safety systems were in place and operative to prevent the intrusion of water. 
The impossibility of the “negligence” argument
According to the “Corporate Negligence” argument, workers had been cleaning out pipes with water nearby. This water was diverted due to a combination of improper maintenance, leaking and clogging, and eventually ended up in the MIC storage tank. Indian scientists also suggested that additional water might have been introduced as a “back-flow” from a defectively designed vent-gas scrubber. None of these theoretical routes of entry were ever successfully demonstrated during tests by the Central Bureau of Investigators (CBI) and UCIL engineers.    
A Union Carbide commissioned analysis conducted by Arthur D. Little claims that the Negligence argument was impossible for several tangible reasons: 
- The pipes being used by the nearby workers were only 1/2 inch in diameter and were physically incapable of producing enough hydraulic pressure to raise water the more than 10 feet that would have been necessary to enable the water to “backflow” into the MIC tank.
- A key intermediate valve would have had to be open for the Negligence argument to apply. This valve was “tagged” closed, meaning that it had been inspected and found to be closed. While it is possible for open valves to clog over time, the only way a closed valve allows penetration is if there is leakage, and 1985 tests carried out by the government of India found this valve to be non-leaking.
- In order for water to have reached the MIC tank from the pipe-cleaning area, it would have had to flow through a significant network of pipes ranging from 6 to 8 inches in diameter, before rising ten feet and flowing into the MIC tank. Had this occurred, most of the water that was in those pipes at the time the tank had its critical reaction would have remained in those pipes, as there was no drain for them. Investigation by the Indian government in 1985 revealed that the pipes were bone dry.
The argument for sabotage
The Union Carbide commissioned Arthur D. Little report concludes that it is likely that a single employee secretly and deliberately introduced a large amount of water into the MIC tank by removing a meter and connecting a water hose directly to the tank through the metering port. 
UCC claims the plant staff falsified numerous records to distance themselves from the incident and absolve themselves of blame, and that the Indian Government impeded its investigation and declined to prosecute the employee responsible, presumably because that would weaken its allegations of negligence by Union Carbide. 
The evidence in favor of this point of view includes:
- A key witness (the “tea boy”) testified that when he entered the control room at 12:15 am, prior to the disaster, the “atmosphere was tense and quiet”.
- Another key witness (the “instrument supervisor”) testified that when he arrived at the scene immediately following the incident, he noticed that the local pressure indicator on the critical Tank 610 was missing, and that he had found a hose lying next to the empty manhead created by the missing pressure indicator, and that the hose had had water running out of it.
- This testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.
- Graphological analysis revealed major attempts to alter logfiles and destroy log evidence.
- Other logfiles show that the control team had attempted to purge 1 ton of material out of Tank 610 immediately prior to the disaster. An attempt was then made to cover up this transfer via log alteration. Water is heavier than MIC, and the transfer line is attached to the bottom of the tank. The Arthur D. Little report concludes from this that the transfer was an effort to transfer water out of Tank 610 that had been discovered there.
- A third key witness (the “off-duty employee of another unit”) stated that “he had been told by a close friend of one of the MIC operators that water had entered through a tube that had been connected to the tank.” This had been discovered by the other MIC operators (so the story was recounted) who then tried to open and close valves to prevent the release.
- A fourth key witness (the “operator from a different unit”) stated that after the release, two MIC operators had told him that water had entered the tank through a pressure gauge.
The Little report argues that this evidence demonstrates that the following chronology took place:
- At 10:20pm, the tank was at normal pressure, indicating the absence of water.
- At 10:45pm, a shift change took place, after which the MIC storage area “would be completely deserted”.
- During this period, a “disgruntled operator entered the storage area and hooked up one of the readily available rubber water hoses to Tank 610, with the intention of contaminating and spoiling the tank’s contents.”
- Water began to flow, beginning the chemical reaction that caused the disaster.
- After midnight, control room operators saw the pressure rising and realized there was a problem with Tank 610. They discovered the water connection, and decided to transfer one ton of the contents out to try and remove the water.
- The disaster then occurred, a major release of poisonous gas.
- The cover-up activities discovered during the investigation then took place.
- After over 30 years, S.P. Choudhary, former MIC Production Manager, broke the silence and told the truth about the disaster that it was not an accident but the result of a sabotage that claimed thousands of lives, a former official of the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) told the district and sessions court.
The theory of design defect was floated by the central government in its endeavour to do justice to the victims of the tragedy. Everyone else who was part of investigations into the case “just toed the line of the central government….
The government and the CBI suppressed the actual truth and saved the real perpetrators of the crime, the counsel, Anirban Roy told the court.”  
In November 2017, appearing for two accused S P Chaudhary and J Mukund, their advocate Anirban Roy told the district court on Monday that disgruntled plant operator M L Verma was behind the sabotage because he was unhappy with his seniors. Roy argued that the theory about defects in the plant causing the mishap was imaginary. He said truth had always been suppressed and it’s for the CBI to bring it out.
The counsel argued that there were discrepancies in the statements given by persons who were operating the plant at that time but the central agency chose not to investigate the case properly because it always wanted to prove that it was a mishap, and not sabotage. He alleged that Verma was unhappy with Chaudhary and Mukund. 
Additional Union Carbide actions
The corporation denied the claim that the valves on the tank were malfunctioning, and claimed that the documented evidence gathered after the incident showed that the valve close to the plant’s water-washing operation was closed and was leak-tight. Furthermore, process safety systems had prevented water from entering the tank by accident. Carbide states that the safety concerns identified in 1982 were all allayed before 1984 and had nothing to do with the incident. 
The company admitted that the safety systems in place would not have been able to prevent a chemical reaction of that magnitude from causing a leak. According to Carbide, “in designing the plant’s safety systems, a chemical reaction of this magnitude was not factored in” because “the tank’s gas storage system was designed to automatically prevent such a large amount of water from being inadvertently introduced into the system” and “process safety systems—in place and operational—would have prevented water from entering the tank by accident”. Instead, they claim that “employee sabotage—not faulty design or operation—was the cause of the tragedy”. 
The company stresses the immediate action taken after the disaster and its continued commitment to helping the victims. On 4 December, the day following the leak, Union Carbide sent material aid and several international medical experts to assist the medical facilities in Bhopal. 
The primary financial restitution paid by UCC was negotiated in 1989, when the Indian Supreme Court approved a settlement of US$470 million (₹1,055 crore (equivalent to ₹80 billion or US$1.1 billion in 2017)). This amount was immediately paid by UCC to the Indian government. The company states that the restitution paid “was $120 million more than plaintiffs’ lawyers had told U.S. courts was fair” and that the Indian Supreme Court stated in its opinion that “compensation levels under the settlement were far greater than would normally be payable under Indian law.” 
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Union Carbide states on its website that it put $2 million into the Indian prime minister’s immediate disaster relief fund on 11 December 1984.  The corporation established the Employees’ Bhopal Relief Fund in February 1985, which raised more than $5 million for immediate relief.  According to Union Carbide, in August 1987, they made an additional $4.6 million in humanitarian interim relief available. 
Union Carbide stated that it also undertook several steps to provide continuing aid to the victims of the Bhopal disaster. The sale of its 50.9 percent interest in UCIL in April 1992 and establishment of a charitable trust to contribute to the building of a local hospital. The sale was finalised in November 1994. The hospital was begun in October 1995 and was opened in 2001. The company provided a fund with around $90 million from sale of its UCIL stock. In 1991, the trust had amounted approximately $100 million. The hospital catered for the treatment of heart, lung and eye problems.  UCC also provided a $2.2 million grant to Arizona State University to establish a vocational-technical center in Bhopal, which was opened, but was later closed by the state government.  They also donated $5 million to the Indian Red Cross after the disaster.  They also developed a Responsible Care system with other members of the chemical industry as a response to the Bhopal crisis, which was designed to help prevent such an event in the future. 
Charges against UCC and UCIL employees
UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson was arrested and released on bail by the Madhya Pradesh Police in Bhopal on 7 December 1984. Anderson was taken to UCC’s house after which he was released six hours later on $2,100 bail and flown out on a government plane. These actions were allegedly taken under the direction of then chief secretary of the state, who was possibly instructed from chief minister’s office, who himself flew out of Bhopal immediately.    Later in 1987, the Indian government summoned Anderson, eight other executives and two company affiliates with homicide charges to appear in Indian court.  In response, Union Carbide said the company is not under Indian jurisdiction. 
From 2014, Dow is a named respondent in a number of ongoing cases arising from Union Carbide’s business in Bhopal. 
Deteriorating section of the MIC plant, decades after the gas leak.
Chemicals abandoned at the plant continue to leak and pollute the groundwater .     Whether the chemicals pose a health hazard is disputed.  Contamination at the site and surrounding area was not caused by the gas leakage. The area around the plant was used as a dumping ground for hazardous chemicals and by 1982 water wells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned.  UCC states that “after the incident, UCIL began clean-up work at the site under the direction of Indian central and state government authorities”, which was continued after 1994 by the successor to UCIL. The successor, Eveready Industries India, Limited (EIIL), ended cleanup on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh.  
UCC’s laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory were toxic to fish. Twenty-one areas inside the plant were reported to be highly polluted. In 1991 the municipal authorities declared that water from over 100 wells was hazardous for health if used for drinking.  In 1994 it was reported that 21% of the factory premises were seriously contaminated with chemicals.    Beginning in 1999, studies made by Greenpeace and others from soil, groundwater, well water and vegetables from the residential areas around UCIL and from the UCIL factory area show contamination with a range of toxic heavy metals and chemical compounds. Substances found, according to the reports, are naphthol , naphthalene , Sevin, tarry residues, alpha naphthol , mercury, organochlorines , chromium , copper, nickel, lead, hexachlorethane, hexachlorobutadiene , pesticide HCH ( BHC ), volatile organic compounds and halo-organics.     Many of these contaminants were also found in breast milk of women living near the area. 
Soil tests were conducted by Greenpeace in 1999. One sample (IT9012) from “sediment collected from drain under former Sevin plant” showed mercury levels to be at “20,000 and 6 million times” higher than expected levels. Organochlorine compounds at elevated levels were also present in groundwater collected from (sample IT9040) a 4.4 meter depth “bore-hole within the former UCIL site”. This sample was obtained from a source posted with a warning sign which read “Water unfit for consumption”. 
Chemicals that have been linked to various forms of cancer were also discovered, as well as trichloroethylene , known to impair fetal development, at 50 times above safety limits specified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  In 2002, an inquiry by Fact-Finding Mission on Bhopal found a number of toxins, including mercury , lead, 1,3,5 trichlorobenzene , dichloromethane and chloroform , in nursing women’s breast milk.
A 2004 BBC Radio 5 broadcast reported the site is contaminated with toxic chemicals including benzene hexachloride and mercury , held in open containers or loose on the ground.  A drinking water sample from a well near the site had levels of contamination 500 times higher than the maximum limits recommended by the World Health Organization .  In 2009, the Centre for Science and Environment , a Delhi-based pollution monitoring lab, released test results showing pesticide groundwater contamination up to three kilometres from the factory.  Also in 2009, the BBC took a water sample from a frequently used hand pump, located just north of the plant. The sample, tested in UK, was found to contain 1,000 times the World Health Organization’s recommended maximum amount of carbon tetrachloride, a carcinogen ic toxin. 
In 2010, a British photojournalist who ventured into the abandoned Union Carbide factory to investigate allegations of abandoned, leaking toxins, was hospitalized in Bhopal for a week after he was exposed to the chemicals. Doctors at the Sambhavna Clinic treated him with oxygen, painkillers and anti-inflammatories following a severe respiratory reaction to toxic dust inside the factory.  
In October 2011, the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment published an article and video by two British environmental scientists, showing the current state of the plant, landfill and solar evaporation ponds and calling for renewed international efforts to provide the necessary skills to clean up the site and contaminated groundwater. 
In popular culture
In 1999, a Hindi film dealing with the tragedy, Bhopal Express , was released. The film stars Kay Kay Menon and Naseeruddin Shah .
Amulya Malladi ‘s 2002 novel A Breath of Fresh Air relates the story of a mother and son who develop health issues as a result of exposure to gas at Bhopal. The book is based on Malladi’s recollections of Bhopal during the incident. 
Indra Sinha released Animal’s People in 2007. The novel tells the story of a boy who is born with a spinal condition due to effects of the gas. The book was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize .
In 2014, to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the disaster, historical-drama Bhopal: A Prayer for Rain was released, starring Martin Sheen as Union Carbide CEO Warren Anderson , Kal Penn , and Mischa Barton . 
Arundhati Roy ‘s 2017 novel The Ministry of Utmost Happiness which deals with many contemporary political issues in India also features several characters still dealing with the aftermath of the gas leak. 
Since 1984, individual activists have played a role in the aftermath of the tragedy. The best-known is Satinath Sarangi (Sathyu), a metallurgic engineer who arrived at Bhopal the day after the leakage. He founded several activist groups, as well as Sambhavna Trust , the clinic for gas affected patients, where he is the manager.  Other activists include Rashida Bee and Champa Devi Shukla, who received the Goldman Prize in 2004, Abdul Jabbar and Rachna Dhingra .  
Soon after the accident, representatives from different activist groups arrived. The activists worked on organising the gas victims, which led to violent repression from the police and the government. 
Numerous actions have been performed: demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes , marches combined with pamphlets, books, and articles. Every anniversary, actions are performed. Often these include marches around Old Bhopal, ending with burning an effigy of Warren Anderson .
Cooperation with international NGOs including Pesticide Action Network UK and Greenpeace started soon after the tragedy. One of the earliest reports is the Trade Union report from ILO 1985. 
In 1992, a session of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights took place in Bhopal, and in 1996, the “Charter on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights” was adopted.
In 1994, the International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) met in Bhopal. Their work contributed to long term health effects being officially recognised.
Important international actions have been the tour to Europe and United States in 2003,  the marches to Delhi in 2006 and 2008, all including hunger strikes, and the Bhopal Europe Bus Tour in 2009.
At least 14 different NGOs were immediately engaged.  The first disaster reports were published by activist organisations, Eklavya and the Delhi Science Forum .
Around ten local organisations, engaged on long term, have been identified. Two of the most active organisations are the women’s organisations—Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila-Stationery Karmachari Sangh and Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangthan. 
More than 15 national organisations have been engaged along with a number of international organisations. 
Some of the organisations are:
- International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal (ICJB), coordinates international activities.
- Bhopal Medical Appeal , collects funds for the Sambhavna Trust.
- Sambhavna Trust or Bhopal People’s Health and Documentation Clinic. Provides medical care for gas affected patients and those living in water-contaminated area.
- Chingari Trust , provides medical care for children being born in Bhopal with malformations and brain damages.
- Students for Bhopal , based in USA.
- International Medical Commission on Bhopal , provided medical information 1994–2000.
Settlement fund hoax
On 3 December 2004, the twentieth anniversary of the disaster, a man falsely claiming to be a Dow representative named Jude Finisterra was interviewed on BBC World News . He claimed that the company had agreed to clean up the site and compensate those harmed in the incident, by liquidating Union Carbide for US$12 billion.   Dow quickly issued a statement saying that they had no employee by that name—that he was an impostor, not affiliated with Dow, and that his claims were a hoax. The BBC later broadcast a correction and an apology. 
Jude Finisterra was actually Andy Bichlbaum , a member of the activist prankster group The Yes Men . In 2002, The Yes Men issued a fake press release explaining why Dow refused to take responsibility for the disaster and started up a website, at “DowEthics.com”, designed to look like the real Dow website, but containing hoax information. 
Monitoring of Bhopal activists
The release of an email cache related to intelligence research organisation Stratfor was leaked by WikiLeaks on 27 February 2012.  It revealed that Dow Chemical had engaged Stratfor to spy on the public and personal lives of activists involved in the Bhopal disaster, including the Yes Men . E-mails to Dow representatives from hired security analysts list the YouTube videos liked, Twitter and Facebook posts made and the public appearances of these activists.  Journalists, film-makers and authors who were investigating Bhopal and covering the issue of ongoing contamination, such as Jack Laurenson and Max Carlson, were also placed under surveillance.   Stratfor released a statement condemning the revelation by Wikileaks while neither confirming nor denying the accuracy of the reports, and would only state that it had acted within the bounds of the law. Dow Chemical also refrained to comment on the matter. 
Ingrid Eckerman, a member of the International Medical Commission on Bhopal , has been denied a visa to visit India. 
- List of industrial disasters
- System accident
- Environmental racism
- Environmental racism in Europe
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- ^ a b Varma, Roli; Daya R. Varma (2005). “The Bhopal Disaster of 1984”. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society.
- ^ a b “Madhya Pradesh Government : Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, Bhopal” . Mp.gov.in. Archived from the original on 18 May 2012. Retrieved 28 August 2012.
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- See also http://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-st-indore/20160721/281603829819042
Union Carbide Corporation
- Methyl Isocyanate. Union Carbide F-41443A – 7/76. Union Carbide Corporation, New York (1976)
- Carbon monoxide, Phosgene and Methyl isocyanate. Unit Safety Procedures Manual. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division: Bhopal (1978)
- Operating Manual Part II. Methyl Isocyanate Unit. Union Carbide India Limited, Agricultural Products Division (1979).
- Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Incident. Investigation Team Report. Union Carbide Corporation, Danbury, CT (1985).
- Presence of Toxic Ingredients in Soil/Water Samples Inside Plant Premises. Union Carbide Corporation, US (1989).
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30 years of Bhopal gas tragedy: a continuing disaster
An appraisal by Sunita Narain and Chandra Bhushan, exclusively extracted from the recently released book, Bhopal Gas Tragedy, After 30 Years
Last Updated: Wednesday 08 July 2015
30 years of Bhopal gas tragedy: A continuing disaster
It was on the night of December 2, 1984, when Bhopal died a million deaths. The chemical, methyl isocyanate (MIC), that spilled out from Union Carbide India Ltd’s (UCIL’s) pesticide factory turned the city into a vast gas chamber. People ran on the streets, vomiting and dying. The city ran out of cremation grounds. It was India’s first (and so far, the only) major industrial disaster. Till then, governments had handled floods, cyclones and even earthquakes. They had no clue how to respond in this case. The US-based multinational company, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), which owned the plant through its subsidiary UCIL, did little to help deal with the human tragedy. Thirty years later, there is no closure. Not because of what happened that fateful night, but because our response has been incompetent and callous.
Bhopal was struck by two tragedies: the one that happened immediately, and the other that unfolded in the years that followed.
The problem was nobody knew much about the toxin or its antidote. Within weeks of the accident many claimed that the worst was over—that people were suffering from common ailments of the poor, such as tuberculosis and anaemia. But till date nobody knows the health impacts of MIC and how to treat patients exposed to the gas. The health burden is compounded by two more variables—one, children born after the disaster are also its victims because of exposure to the deadly gas while they were in their mothers’ wombs; two, chemical wastes remain dumped in and around the premises of UCIL factory, contaminating the water that people drink.
All this could have been managed if the government had information about the chemical and treatment for it. But even in 2014, all that the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) in Delhi can say is the “exact causative agent of the Bhopal Gas Disease is unknown”. Why?
Union Carbide used trade secrecy as a prerogative to withhold information on the exact composition of the leaked gases. Though it was known that MIC, when reacts with water at high temperatures, could release as many as 300 highly toxic chemicals, research was carried out only to check the toxicity of pure MIC—that also on animals. So, the treatment has been symptomatic. This is criminal negligence. In the first few days, there was evidence that people could be suffering from cyanide poisoning—intravenous injections of sodium thiosulphate, an antidote, was found to be working on the patients. But soon, it was discontinued, many say, under pressure from UCC and its team of lawyers.
The diseases could also have been managed had the government conducted medical research to understand the long-term impacts of the gas. The responsibility was given to ICMR, which had initiated 24 studies.Some of the studies had found high incidence of lung, eye disease and morbidity in the victims. But the studies were summarily discontinued in 1994. All research work was left to Madhya Pradesh government’s Centre for Rehabilitation Studies, which did some uninspired research. Meanwhile, some independent studies had also pointed to serious health crises, from cancer and mental problems to birth defects. But since there is no epidemiological study, it is easy to dismiss these as ailments caused by poverty and lack of hygiene. This is when the Supreme Court has repeatedly asked for the patient records to be computerised and for studies to determine health impacts of this toxic exposure.
Ongoing struggle for relief
In 1989, UCC paid some US $470 million (worth Rs 750 crore that year. Then the rupee devalued. This, along with interest, swelled to Rs 3,058.40 crore by 2009) as compensation for the disaster—one-seventh of the original demand from the Indian government. In return, under the Supreme Court brokered deal, all civil and criminal cases against the company were terminated. The apex court also laid down guidelines for the money—the family of the dead were to be given Rs 1-3 lakh, which was three times higher than compensation for deaths in motor vehicle accident cases, said the court. In addition, fully or partially disabled were to get Rs 50,000-2 lakh and those with temporary injury, Rs 25,000-1 lakh.
When the case began, the government said there were some 3,000 deaths and 30,000 cases of injury. Later, it was realised that many more were suffering from exposure to the poisonous gas. So, when the case was decided, compensation was doled out to virtually the entire city. Some 573,588 people got money as “affected” by the gas leakage—many times above the number of claims filed, and representing some 70 per cent of the city population in 1980. Of them, 5,295 were death cases, in which families of the victims got a paltry Rs 2-3 lakh as compensation. The rest—568,293—were classified as injured. As the government deducted what was paid over six years as interim relief, the final settlement was less than Rs 15,000 per victim.
This meant nothing to the victims whose medical bills have continued to mount. They say many deaths have not been counted. But courts and governments have continued to dismiss their plea to reopen the case of compensation settlement. Then in 2010, the Group of Ministers (GoM) on the Bhopal gas tragedy decided that it would only agree to enhance payments to the already counted victims. It agreed to an additional compensation of Rs 10 lakh in the 5,295 cases of death and Rs 1 lakh-5 lakh in the cases of disability, renal failure and cancer. But it added that the amount already paid should be deducted. The affected who have lost their lives and livelihoods say the GoM only rubbed salt in their wound— paid compensation to people who are not affected and neglected the many who suffer every day as they are not listed among those with serious and permanent disability.
Bhopal disaster 2.0
People of Bhopal are suffering another legacy of UCIL. The factory used to manufacture three pesticides: carbaryl (trade name Sevin), aldicarb (trade name Temik) and a formulation of carbaryl and gamma-hexachlorocyclohexane (g-HCH), sold under the trade name, Sevidol. For 15 years till the disaster, it dumped process wastes, by-products, solvents, sub-standard products, wastes from machinery and polluted water at dump sites inside and outside the plant. Another 350 tonnes of waste has been kept in a leaking shed at the site. These wastes are still lying at the site, polluting soil and groundwater. This second legacy—Bhopal Disaster 2.0—now threatens even a larger number of people than the first one. Many of the chemicals degrade slowly and are likely to remain in the environment for hundreds of years. They will keep spreading unless they are taken out and the site is decontaminated.
The worst part is cleaning and decontamination of the site has got embroiled in legal wrangles of how to clean the site, what should be done with the wastes and who should pay for it— state governments, the Centre, successor buyer of the factory, Dow Chemical, waste disposal and incineration companies, research institutes or non-profits.
In the past few years, particularly since the release of a study by Delhi non-profit Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) and the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), another controversy has erupted—whether or not the contamination has spread through groundwater. Most studies found groundwater surrounding the UCIL site to be contaminated with chlorinated benzenes and HCH isomers. Carbaryl, aldicarb, carbon tetrachloride and chloroform were also detected in some studies. All these can be linked to the wastes dumped by UCIL plant.
But in a study in 2010 by two key government institutes—National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) and National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI)—no groundwater contamination was found. These institutes only found isolated contamination, which they attributed to the annual surface runoff during monsoon. They concluded that due to extremely low permeability of the black and yellow silty clay, there is limited movement of contaminants towards the groundwater. Interestingly, this type of soil was only found at UCIL site. In surrounding areas, other studies have found far higher permeability. The implication of NEERI-NGRI study is huge. If the site is unique, and hence there is no groundwater contamination happening from the site, then the site can be cleaned-up easily and at a much lower cost. If that is not the case, then groundwater too will have to be decontaminated, which will be very expensive.
From the very beginning, UCC has shed its liability towards its Indian subsidiary, arguing that it had nothing to do with the disaster. As recently as August 2014, the US courts decided that UCC (and so Dow chemical) cannot be held responsible for the management of the Indian subsidiary. But one case still continues. In 2004, a resident of Bhopal, Alok Pratap Singh, filed a case in the Madhya Pradesh high court, demanding Dow be held responsible for the pollution. The Union government supported this position by filing an application in this case and asking Dow to deposit Rs 100 crore for environmental remediation. Dow has continued frantic lobbying to get the Indian government to withdraw its application—with everyone from industrialist Ratan Tata to former chairperson of the Planning Commission, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, and former finance minister, P Chidambaram, petitioning on behalf of the company.
But as of now, the high court has not deleted Dow from the list of respondents. So, maybe, in this case, the liability of the company, at least in terms of the hazardous waste it has left behind, will be established. The company will be required to pay for remediation or restoration at the very least. Then maybe, just maybe, the victims of Bhopal will get some closure. After 30 years.
WHY NO CLOSURE
This is because everything that could have gone wrong in the initial years after the tragedy went wrong. After this, all that the people and activists have done is to try and reverse those fatally damaging actions—with little success.
The Indian judiciary succumbed, many would say, by agreeing to a paltry compensation and by settling all civil and criminal liability of the company. Then the company did everything to ensure that its complicity and responsibility was diluted. One such instance is of not informing doctors of the real toxicity of the chemicals released and the treatment for them. ICMR failed the victims by not completing the studies that would have established the cause of their ailments and suggesting treatment protocols. So, there is a name for the disease—Bhopal Gas Disease—but no identification of who the affected are or what their treatment status is. The Union government, as a result, continues to argue that only 5,295 people died—in the first instance and never later—and 6,199 have been permanently disabled. It refuses to accept, without medical history, that the tragedy has been much more enormous and that death and disability stalk every house in the localities close to the factory. The state government put the final nail in their coffin by distributing the compensation amount so widely that it does not matter who is the actual victim and who is not.
But there are more reasons for the failure. First, there are too many institutions involved, and they have little interest in fixing the problem. In the case of medical relief, on paper, all has been provided to ensure that people get timely and best treatment. A super-speciality hospital has been set up. Treatment has been assured without payment. The Supreme Court even set up two committees—one to monitor the functioning of the medical system and the other to advise on what needs to be done for the best care of the victims. The state government has a separate department for gas relief and usually a senior minister is in charge of the department. Even at the Centre there is a clear mandate with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers to oversee all affairs. Yet, medical care is abysmal. The victims continue to say they do not even have water to drink.
Take the issue of decontamination. The case is being heard by the Supreme Court and the Madhya Pradesh high court, who issue regular directions in this regard. Then there is a task force for removal of toxic waste from the plant, headed by the secretary of the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals at the Centre. An Oversight Committee is coordinating and monitoring activities relating to waste disposal, decontamination and remediation. The minister of state for environment chairs this committee. At the bottom of the rung are the Central and state pollution control boards, that are supposed to monitor the site and provide technical support for the decontamination work. The institutional logjam is such that there is no one institution that can be held responsible and accountable for decontaminating the site.
Secondly, over time, most residents of the city have moved away and beyond the disaster. The civil society groups that remain are intensely committed and driven by the injustice and lack of action. But there is such deep distrust between the government and activists working in Bhopal that every action proposed is obstructed—mainly by taking the matter to court. As national and international media interest remains high in the case, each incident is played out and charges and counter-charges are made on television and in newspapers. The result is everything has been left to the courts to decide; the state and the Central agencies have taken the backseat.
After the 1989 decision, which rewrote history of jurisprudence by absolving UCC of corporate criminal liability, the courts have given directions on relief and rehabilitation. But in the polarised and indifferent environment, even their directions have come to naught. This is partly because there is no clarity about what needs to be done and what can be done given the past mess-ups.
What stands out is that Indian institutions are incapable of resolving conflicts. But there is learning for activists and non-profits. In no way should the fight become an end in itself so that issues remain unresolved.
BHOPALS IN OUR LIFE
The disaster had impacts far beyond the boundary of the ill-fated city and its people. It made a difference worldwide to the way that chemical and hazardous waste management was reinforced; workers’ safety precautions mandated; and legislation for environmental management strengthened. Perhaps, this is why we have not seen another Bhopal-like disaster in the past 30 years.
But the work is not over yet. In India we continue to see smaller industrial accidents—mini-Bhopals. Hazardous wastes are piling up in many parts, contaminating land and water and endangering lives. But we do not have the means or methods to remediate these toxic sites. How do we prevent not just another Bhopal but also the mini-Bhopals from happening?
Laws changed but not followed
The first major legislation that came post-Bhopal was the Environment (Protection) Act (EPA) of 1986. “EPA bears the stamp of the legislature’s immediate concern after Bhopal to strengthen the regulatory framework for hazardous industry and pollution control,” write lawyers, Shyam Divan and Armin Rosencranz, in their critique, Environmental Law and Policy in India. EPA is India’s first legislation that gave authority to the Centre to issue direct orders to close, prohibit or regulate any industry. It is also an enabling law, which delegates wide powers to the executive, allowing it to make rules to manage different issues. Over the years, EPA has been translated into a range of Central rules and regulations, laying down pollution norms and setting rules for the management of hazardous waste.
By 1989, the country got the Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules for management, storage and import of hazardous chemicals. Even the protection of coastal areas is done under EPA as its subordinate rules. In 1987, amendments were made in the Factories Act, 1948, which empowers states to appoint site appraisal committees to advise on the location of factories using hazardous processes. It also sets up systems for the safety of workers and residents nearby and specifies emergency disaster control plans. In 1991, the Public Liability Insurance Act was enacted to provide for immediate relief to persons affected by accidents while handling hazardous substances. Under the Act, an environment relief fund was set up to compensate affected people.
Despite these legislation in place, India is fast losing the battle of environmental protection and management of hazardous waste.
Take the Factories Act. According to the latest data published by the Ministry of Labour and Employment, in 2011, the total dead and injured in 2011 were 10,441. That year, over 1,000 people lost their lives in factory accidents. Not surprising that the states with the worst worker safety records were the industrialised Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. Gujarat was the worst, with close to 250 dead and 3,000 injured. A review of past years’ newspaper reports shows industrial accidents continue to take place across the country. Just in the 10 months of 2014, there are reports of as many as eight industrial incidents, where workers have died or been hospitalised. Many more cases would have gone unreported.
In addition, there is the problem of growing toxic contamination of land and water. This means, even though hazardous waste management rules provide for inventories, storage and safe disposal of such toxic substances, these work more in the breach. As waste continues to stockpile, more areas are contaminated. In 2010, with great fanfare the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) launched a project for remediation of hazardous waste contaminated sites (see ‘Bhopal-like disasters in the making’). A total of 10 toxic sites were identified. Consultants were hired to plan for remediation and the matter has stopped there. These sites hold thousands of tonnes of highly toxic waste—like Bhopal’s UCIL factory.
|Bhopal-like disasters in the making|
Hazardous waste contaminated sites identified by the Central Pollution Control Board
The problem is institutional management provisions of legislation remain only on paper. For instance, the Chemical Accidents Rule provides for setting up a central crisis group. The information on the website of MoEF, its nodal ministry, shows just how inconsequential this has become for the government. The name and phone number of the head of the crisis group is given as T K A Nair, who was secretary in the mid-1990s. But the group does not exist, not even on paper. This is the real crisis of India. We have set up the framework but have nothing to fill it up with.
Agenda: 30 years hence
To chart this out, let’s understand the situation today. The state pollution control boards are required to give the industry consent to establish and then consent to operate. In addition, they must give authorisations under various EPA rules for plastic, battery, municipal waste and, now, e-waste. But all that the pollution boards do is to process the consent and authorisation. They do not have time to monitor compliance with standards for pollution or enforce their directions. This paperwork—processing consent applications—brings them their main source of income.
Our analysis shows that on an average, a state pollution board collects about one water sample per factory and surveys less than 25 per cent of the units for air quality. In fact, the entire environmental monitoring depends on self-reporting by industries, which are required to get samples of effluents tested in private laboratories and submit the data to the pollution board. It is another matter that the laboratories are, in many cases, extremely inadequate and unskilled. It is another matter that the pollution board officials do not even have time to look at the reports. It is about paperwork, not about controlling pollution. It is not about enforcement.
What really hurts is these self-monitored samples cannot even be used for enforcement. So, even if a report submitted by an industry shows that it exceeds the norms, the board cannot use this for enforcement. Instead, what is required is a cumbersome and highly suspect sampling protocol under which the board officials first have to inform the industry that they will be visiting—time and place—for inspection, and only this sample can be used for enforcement. It is, therefore, no surprise that only 2 per cent of the show cause notices get converted into legal action.
There is also no deterrence in the system. The maximum penalty imposed by courts under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act is Rs 10,000 and under EPA, it is Rs 1 lakh. But only courts can impose this penalty. So all the boards can do is to either deny the consent to operate or issue closure notice for 30 days. Both options are not feasible. So, very little is done to act against the polluter. Without effective enforcement, the system is not even worth the paper on which the many forms are filled and filed.
This is the case with clearances—environment, forest, coastal and wildlife—required for projects. These key instruments ensure that environmental damage is mitigated. These procedures have become riddled with processes, but no outcome. In the case of environmental clearances there is a near-zero rejection rate; instead, conditions are set at the time of sanctioning a project knowing fully well that there is no capacity or will to monitor compliance.
Forest clearance is an even bigger paper tiger—94 per cent of projects are cleared without an impact assessment of the project in terms of forest, biodiversity or livelihoods of the many who live in these habitats. Then, it is stipulated that compensatory afforestation will be done for each hectare diverted. But nobody really knows if the trees are even planted, let alone if they survive. The system continues with this farce of taking action—as if laws and processes are enough to make a difference. This can be fixed. Changing this requires strengthening institutions. This is the agenda for environmental governance 30 years after Bhopal.
Today pollution boards have high number of vacancies—from 30 per cent in states like Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and Odisha to 60 per cent in Bihar and Karnataka. The Central Pollution Control Board is without a full time chairperson for the past some years. Working conditions across these institutions is poor. But all governments run away from this agenda. Instead of fixing what is broken, they make new institutions, adding to multiplicity and confusion.
The other agenda is to improve tools for compliance and enforcement. This requires taking hard decisions to decriminalise the current Acts, so that enforcement by civil administration is easier. Everything does not have to go to court for decision. But at the same time it means penalties need to be increased and processes must be made transparent. All this cannot be done unless there is a credible, rigorous system for collecting samples as you cannot hold a polluter responsible without proof.
The last, but most critical agenda post 30 years of Bhopal, is to do everything that increases the participation of local people, worst impacted by environmental degradation and toxification, in governance. This can be done through more transparent public hearings, more public data dissemination and ways in which people are heard, not just listened to.
The bottom-line is that India’s environmental management system is a half done job. It requires to be finished so that we can meet the challenges of growth in a way that is both sustainable and inclusive. Only then will we really learn the lessons of the world’s most horrific industrial disaster in Bhopal.
Liability cannot be forgotten
After 30 years, the government of India is still struggling to establish the liability of UCIL, its parent company UCC and its buyer, Dow Chemical. Shame.
Consider the difference. In 2009, when petroleum giant BP’s oil drilling led to a devastating spill in the Gulf of Mexico, US President Barack Obama did not need to ask, whose “ass he should kick”. His government held those responsible to pay for the damage and reversed the earlier decision to cap liability in such cases. In 1989, when Exxon spilled gallons of oil off the coast of Alaska, the compensation for economic loss and punitive damages was fixed at US $1 billion, as against the Bhopal “relief” of US $470 million. The dead seals of the Atlantic were valued higher than the thousands of humans who lost lives in Bhopal and continue to suffer even today.
In Bhopal, the US multinational company UCC argued sabotage. The Indian government could not (or would not) prove negligence or regulatory failure or even lack of responsible adherence to internal safety standards. The liability was never established, partly because of ignorance, combined with powerlessness. Today, when the government is faced with the cost of remediation of toxic waste—left behind by the company—it is still not able to establish the liability of the company. The GoM, led by former home minister P Chidambaram, recommended “that the government should request the courts to expeditiously decide the question of liability of Dow Chemical Company and/or any other successor to UCC/UCIL.” In other words, the government is not even prepared to look the facts in the face and decide that the company that polluted and left behind hazardous waste has to be held liable for cleaning it up.
The courts have also been vacillating on this issue. As lawyers Divan and Rosencranz explain, the Supreme Court replaced traditional doctrine of liability with the rule of “absolute” liability. In the Shriram gas leak case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1986, the then chief justice P N Bhagwati observed that the principles and norms for determining the liability of large enterprises engaged in the manufacture and sale of hazardous products were questions of greatest importance. So, in its judgement the Supreme Court bench established that the “enterprise owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken”. The justices go on to say, “we would hold that enterprise strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylandsv Fletcher.” Under this rule, strict liability is subject to a number of exceptions, like sabotage or the plaintiff’s own fault, which reduce its scope. This principle was applied by the Madhya Pradesh high court to support its award of interim compensation to Bhopal gas leak victims. The court ruled that the liability of the enterprise is “unquestionable”.
But this principle of “absolute liability” was questioned and then subsequently whittled down by the Supreme Court, ironically when it was asked to review the Bhopal settlement. Justice Ranganath Misra and Justice M N Venkatachaliah rejected the “absolute” liability, saying UCC was entitled to its day in court when its defences, if factual, would be heard and tested. “Indeed”, said the justices, “we should not proceed on the premise that the liability of UCC has been firmly established. UCC has seriously contested the basis of its alleged liability.” By recognising UCC’s right to raise and urge defences, the court, say Divan and Rosencranz, stepped out from the “without exception” absolute liability principle, which it had earlier agreed to.
Corporate liability is a must
Bhopal is about our collective shame. It is also about how systems of corporate liability remain grossly inadequate in a world where technology is high-risk and unknown.
The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act 2010 is about who will foot the bill for accidents from such hazardous technologies. Even today, this provision to hold the operator liable for nuclear damage is a bugbear in Indo-US talks. Why?
Why should we not demand that the operator must pay the cost of safety, even if it increases insurance premiums and so, raises the cost of energy that is supplied? If it makes nuclear energy unviable then it only reflects the cost of generation—in real and safe terms. In other words, why should we not demand that if we must continue to use high-risk technologies then we must take on expensive safeguards, even if it makes technology uncompetitive. In the post-Bhopal age, all technologies must pay the real cost of their present and future dangers. Only then will we, as a society, try and understand the risks better. Only then will we, as a society, make better technology choices.
Many countries have adopted the principle of absolute liability when it comes to the introduction of genetically modified organisms. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (under the convention on biological diversity) is the world’s first such attempt to hold operators responsible for damage—both from imminent and real threats—from the use of new technology.
More importantly, the issue of corporate liability is crucial, for only then will powerful companies worry about the implications of their actions on tomorrow’s generations. Today, they think of short-term and run-away profits—in chemicals, GM foods, nuclear energy or mining and drilling—in ways where no one (or science) has ever gone. We need tough corporate liability so that companies think twice before they expose us to dangers. Let them fret; we want to sleep in peace.
This is why Bhopal must never be forgotten, indeed must be fixed. Dow Chemical must be held liable for the toxic waste still present in the abandoned factory. It must pay for the plant site’s remediation. It must do this quickly, before toxins spread more poison, travelling through groundwater, into people’s bodies. This is also why Bhopal is not just about Bhopal, but about our collective action to bring justice to the people and do right to the environment across the world.
Methyl Isocyanate (MIC)
Bhopal Gas Disaster
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